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From December 1941 to May 1942 Japanese armed forces had achieved 
a remarkable string of victories. Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore 
were lost and US forces in the Philippines were in full retreat. 
Additionally, the Japanese had landed in Timor and bombed Darwin. 
The rapid successes had caught their strategic planners somewhat by 
surprise. The naval and army staffs eventually agreed on a compromise 
plan for future operations which would involve the invasion of New 
Guinea and the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi. Known as 
Operation MO, the plan aimed to cut off the eastern sea approaches 
to Darwin and cut the lines of communication between Australia and 
the United States. 
Operation MO was highly complex and involved six separate naval 
forces. It aimed to seize the islands of Tulagi in the Solomons and 
Deboyne off the east coast of New Guinea. Both islands would then 
be used as bases for flying boats which would conduct patrols into 
the Coral Sea to protect the flank of the Moresby invasion force which 
would sail from Rabaul. 
That the Allied Forces were in the Coral Sea area in such strength 
in late April 1942 was no accident. Much crucial intelligence had been 
gained by the American ability to break the Japanese naval codes. 
This allowed Allied Commanders to be almost as well informed 
as the Japanese Commanders. In contrast, Japanese naval intelligence 
appears to have had an incomplete picture of the disposition of the 
US forces, particularly the US aircraft carriers. 
The two American carrier groups (Lexington — Rear Admiral Fitch 
and Yorktown — Rear Admiral Fletcher) rendezvoused in the Coral 
Sea and commenced fuelling on the 1 May. A second rendezvous was 
set for the morning of 4 May and this would see the Australian cruisers 
Australia and Hobart join the force for the first time. The day before 
the Japanese carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were northeast of Rabaul 
as the llilagi invasion group was landing. 
On receiving advice of the landings at lUlagi, Fletcher turned the 
Yorktown group northeast and by 6.30am on 4 May, Yorktown 
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launched the first strike against Tulagi. This and subsequent strikes 
confirmed any suspicions the Japanese had about the presence of 
American carriers in the Coral Sea. They also destroyed Japanese 
reconnaissance capability out of lUlagi. 
On completion of the Tulagi strike Fletcher retired south to 
rendezvous with other Allied forces. This was achieved on 5 May and 
refuelling began. On its completion, Fletcher headed for the Louisiade 
Archipelago (south east of New Guinea) to intercept the Japanese 
forces he expected to pass through there en route to Port Moresby. 
Meanwhile the carriers of the Japanese carrier striking force were 
rounding the southern tip of the Solomons and about to enter the 
Coral Sea behind the American carriers. 
Next day a Japanese land based reconnaissance aircraft spotted the 
American carrier group refuelling but this information did not reach 
the Japanese Admiral (Tagaki) for another day. American aircraft 
launched during the afternoon flew over the Japanese carriers without 
spotting them due to the heavy cloud cover. Meanwhile, Tagaki, having 
found nothing, headed north and commenced to refuel only 70 miles 
from the US carriers. At the end of the day, Fletcher, having refuelled 
his ships, despatched the almost empty tanker, Neosho, to the south 
with the destroyer Sims as escort. 
THE CORAL SEA BATTLE 
Early on the morning of the 7 May Fletcher split his force by detaching 
Grace (Rear Admiral J C Grace, Royal Navy) and the support group 
to cover the Jomard Passage and intercept the Japanese invasion force. 
This was a risky and important decision. Not only did Fletcher weaken 
his own defences, he also exposed Grace's ships to the possibility of 
air attack without hope of fighter protection. In the event, Grace's 
support group was located by Japanese aircraft at 8.10am and air 
attacks commenced later that afternoon. On their return to Rabaul, 
the Japanese airmen reported that they had sunk one battleship, 
damaged a second and also a cruiser. In fact, neither the Japanese 
aircraft nor a group of American B17s which accidentally attacked 
the cruisers later in the day, scored a single direct hit. As a result of 
the inaccurate battle reports, no further strikes were launched from 
Rabaul. The support group never came to grips with the Japanese 
invasion force as it reversed course while the "battleship" sightings 
were clarified. 
At Sam the Japanese launched a 78 aircraft strike from the carriers 
Shokaku and Zuikaku against a reported American carrier and cruiser 
sighted to the south. About an hour later, a second report arrived 
advising the Japanese Admiral that an American carrier and about 
ten other ships were sighted 300 odd miles to his north west. As it 
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was too late to recall the aircraft, all that the Japanese commander 
could do was wait for their return. The two American ships were 
located at 9.54am and the Japanese realised that they had located 
Neosho and Sims. During the course of the subsequent attacks Sims 
was sunk and Neosho so heavily damaged that she was later sunk 
by torpedo and gunfire. 
The Americans, meanwhile, were attempting to locate the Japanese 
carriers. At 8.15am on 7 May, an erroneous sighting report indicated 
that a force of two carriers and four cruisers was 235 miles northwest 
of the Americans. Acting on this report, Fletcher immediately began 
launching a strike of some 90 aircraft from both carriers. It was not 
until after the last of these aircraft were launched that the error was 
realised. At 10.22am a message was received that landbased aircraft 
had spotted a carrier and other ships a few miles north of Misima 
Island. The outbound strike was re-directed to this target. When 
sighted at about 11am, Shoho and her escorts were in an area of clear 
weather. Lexington's divebombers and torpedo bombers began a 
coordinated attack followed almost immediately by Yorktown's 
divebombers. By the time Yorktown'siorptdo aircraft attacked, Shoho 
was already doomed. 
The Mushroom Cloud Rising from the stricken Lexington — John Oxley Library 
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Admiral Tagaki on learning of the attack on Shoho was powerless 
to act because of his earlier decision to attack the incorrectly reported 
aircraft carrier and cruiser (Neosho and Sims). Once his aircraft 
returned, Tkgaki decided to launch a late afternoon strike against the 
American carriers although he had no firm idea of their position. 
For this attempted strike Tkgaki selected his most experienced aircrew 
because the aircraft would be returning after dark. TWelve divebombers 
and fifteen torpedo bombers launched in three groups at 4.30pm. 
These flights could not locate the Americans and jettisoned their 
ordnance. On the return flight one group of Japanese flew almost 
over the top of the Americans but failed to see them. The American 
carriers, using their radar to good effect, detected the returning 
Japanese. In the ensuing melee eight Japanese aircraft were shot down 
for the loss of three Americans. More importantly, Tagaki had lost 
eight (almost a tenth) of his most experienced air crew. 
On the morning of 8 May both sides located their opponents almost 
simultaneously. The Americans commenced launching their aircraft 
at 9am whilst the Japanese launch commenced 15 minutes later. The 
Japanese and American aircraft passed each other but heavy cloud 
prevented any sightings. The first American aircraft arrived over the 
two Japanese carriers at 10.30am. On arrival of the slower torpedo 
bombers (10 minutes later) they commenced a co-ordinated attack. 
At 10.57am Yorktown's aircraft attacked Shokaku. Zuikaku 
meanwhile had managed to hide in a rain squall. Shokaku avoided 
all torpedoes that were launched at her but she was hit by a number 
of bombs. Damage and fires prevented her from launching aircraft. 
While the American aircraft were attacking Shokaku, the Japanese 
aircraft were detected by Lexington's radar at 70 miles and closing. 
During the attack, Lexington was hit in the port side forward by a 
torpedo and then a second hit opposite the bridge. She was then hit 
by at least two bombs and just missed by several more. As a result 
of these attacks, fuel tanks were ruptured and the ship was on fire 
in at least four places and listing six degrees to port. 
Yorktown was also attacked by the Japanese and managed to avoid 
the torpedoes but was hit by one bomb. Shortly after 12.30pm, 
Lexington was rocked by a large internal explosion caused by the build 
up of petrol fumes. This started new fires which gradually spread and 
at 5.07pm the order was given to abandon ship. She was finally sunk 
by torpedoes. With the last oiLexington's aircraft on board Yorktown, 
the remainder of the force withdrew to the south and thence to Pearl 
Harbour. 
Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese were not in a position 
to take advantage of the loss of the Lexington. Shokaku was so badly 
damaged that she had to return to Truk for repairs before going on 
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to Japan. Zuikaku was low on fuel and had less than forty serviceable 
aircraft left. As a consequence. Admiral Inouye ordered the ships to 
retire and postponed the Moresby invasion. Admiral Yamamoto, 
Commander in Chief of the Combined Japanese Fleet, however, 
ordered pursuit of the Americans. They broke off the search on 11 
May for lack of forces and Yamamoto had missed his chance to 
destroy a large proportion of the US Pacific fleet. 
THE AFTERMATH 
The battle of the Coral Sea was claimed by both Japanese and the 
Allies as a victory. On the Japanese part they managed to sink more 
American ships than they lost. The Allies prevented the Japanese from 
achieving their objective which was the occupation of Port Moresby. 
Against this must be weighed the fact that the Japanese assault forces 
remained intact and all that stood in the way of the Japanese and 
Port Moresby were Grace's cruisers. 
Notwithstanding its inconclusive nature, the battle's place in history 
has been assured. For the first time two fleets had fought a naval 
engagement in which the constituent naval units never saw each other. 
It marked the end of the battleship as the major striking unit of 
modern fleets. Subsequent naval operations, whilst demonstrating the 
need for a well balanced and highly trained naval force, were to 
highlight the flexibility of carrier borne air power. 
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